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PRICE NEGOTIATION
STRATEGIES ADOPTED BY
SHIPPERS OF INTERNATIONAL
AIR AND OCEAN TRANSPORTATION

Padmapriya Baboo
Pennsylvania State University
Evelyn Thomchick
Pennsylvania State University

ABSTRACT
Government regulations in the international air and ocean shipping industry have undergone
a wide range of new developments geared towards deregulation. These changes, coupled with
the emergence of new technologies, have facilitated foreign trade operations leading to a
substantial increase in international air and ocean cargo traffic in recent years.
This study investigates the regulation reforms that have affected pricing techniques in both
industries and their implications on the negotiation strategies adopted by shippers and
carriers. The survey results identified that each shipping firm negotiated on a variety of
issues and employed more than one strategy for negotiating price.

INTRODUCTION
Globalization and international transporta
tion have gained prominence more than ever
before in the later half of the twentieth
century. The relaxation of U.S. government
regulations through the deregulation of both
the air and ocean industries contributed to
an increase in international air and ocean
cargo traffic. Coupled with emerging advance

ments in technology in the 1990’s, there has
been a significant decrease in the complexi
ties associated with the movement, storage,
and tracking of international consignments,
thereby facilitating foreign trade operations.
Together, both of these factors have played a
vital role in the facilitation of global trade.
As a result, many firms now pursue global
sourcing to utilize worldwide resources and
worldwide technology more efficiently to
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create a competitive advantage for them
selves in the marketplace (Thomchick 2000).
This study provides a turn-of-the-century
view of the regulations that have governed
rate-making so far in both the international
air and ocean shipping industries. The
changes that occurred in the rate making
process in the post-deregulated era in both
industries are identified. In the case of the
air transport industry, the most recent
development in regulation was that of the
‘open skies’ bilateral air service agreements
that began in the United States in 1992
(Doganis 2001). In the case of the ocean
transport industry, the Ocean Shipping
Reform Act (OSRA) of 1998 was the most
significant development, completely altering
the way shippers and carriers conducted
business with each other.
These changes laid the foundation for this
study. Although much research has been
conducted on the impact of deregulation
reforms on the air freight and ocean cargo
industry, no study to date has performed an
analysis of the price negotiation strategies
employed by international shippers in the
post-deregulated era. Thus, the objective of
this study is to perform an analysis of price
negotiation strategies adopted by shippers of
international air and ocean transportation in
the post-deregulated era. From a more micro
view, the research examines the price nego
tiation strategies adopted by a selected
sample of shippers of international air and
ocean cargo. The study provides valuable
information on the negotiation strategies and
carrier selection practices employed by a
selected sample of international shippers of
diverse goods. All international shippers
should benefit from this knowledge since
these strategies represent current industry
practices.
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The research began with a review of the
literature on the deregulation reforms that
impacted the different approaches adopted in
rate making in the air freight and ocean
cargo industries. A survey of international
shipping firms was then conducted by
sending out a structured questionnaire via email. The survey provided information on the
factors that influence the carrier selection
process and the price negotiation strategies
adopted by the respondents. Conclusions
were drawn regarding the negotiation stra
tegies and carrier selection practices adopted
by the sample.

LITERATURE REVIEW
International Air Transport
Regulation and Cargo Pricing
Until the early 1930’s, air was employed
primarily for the transport of passengers. The
usage of air for transporting cargo began in the
early 1930's when airlines started transporting
airmail (Williams, 1994). National Air
Transport, organized in 1926, was the pioneer
that employed airlines for the transport of all
property other than mail and passengers’
baggage (Williams 1994). However, after the
establishment of the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB), through the passage of the Civil Aero
nautics Act in 1938, many carriers began to
show interest in the air freight business
(Williams 1994; Taneja 1980).
United Airlines initiated all-cargo service by
offering the first domestic service between
New York and Chicago in December 1940.
American, United, and TWA followed suit by
offering regular transcontinental cargo
service from 1945 onwards (Williams 1994).
At the same time in 1944, an agreement was
reached in an intergovernmental conference
in Chicago establishing a global association

for overseeing the rate making process. In
April 1945, the International Air Transport
Association (IATA) was formed for the
purpose of rate making.
The final structure of the IATA resulted from
the signing of the Air Services agreement in
Bermuda in 1946 (Williams 1994). IATA’s
rate making process included the following
steps. The rate fixing machinery initially
arrived at a comprehensive pattern of
specified fares on the basis of certain basic
currencies, including the U.S. Dollar and the
Pound Sterling. The specified fares were
approved by the members of the IATA. The
fares of individual carriers were based on
their specific needs and calculated after con
sidering various factors that influenced the
tariff rates both directly and indirectly
(Williams 1994). These factors included
distance, cost of service, price elasticity of
demand, specific needs of carriers serving
particular trade lanes, government needs,
anticipated demand patterns, availability
and nature of competition in specific routes
(Williams 1994).
The CAB approved the IATA traffic confer
ence machinery on February 19, 1946, for a
period of one year (Doganis 2001; Williams
1994) and later made it permanent in 1955
(Doganis 2001). Thus, IATA traffic confer
ences began to provide a multilateral link in
the bilateral system to coordinate rate
proposals between carriers, prior to govern
ment review, until deregulation occurred in
1977-78. During the period from 1946 to
1978, IATA had been under constant criti
cism for being a cartel with monopoly power
to set rates and fares for international air
transport (Taneja 1979). As a result, the
CAB issued a show cause order proposing to
disapprove IATA traffic conference provi
sions and related resolutions in June 1978
(Taneja 1979).

In 1977, the Carter administration initiated
a chain of events that transformed the
international air transport industry from a
closed and protected industry to an open and
competitive one (Doganis 2001). Although
the Air Passenger Deregulation Act was
passed in 1978, the air cargo industry was
deregulated separately in the second half of
1977.
On August 21,1978, President Jimmy Carter
issued a comprehensive statement on
“international air transport negotiations,”
setting forth the U.S. policy for the conduct
of international air transport negotiations
(Doganis 2001). This agreement effectively
deregulated air cargo services between
countries by introducing a double disappro
val regime for fares, which suggested that
the filed tariffs became operative unless both
governments disapproved it. In the pre
deregulated era, double approval of fares by
both governments was required.
By early 1990’s, it became clear to many
countries that the “open market” bilaterals
had not gone far enough and needed further
liberalization (Doganis 2001). An “open
skies” agreement was inaugurated to enable
a new phase of international deregulation
(Doganis 2001). The key element of this
bilateral, with regard to cargo pricing policy,
was that there would be no tariff controls
except in instances where the tariff was
leaning more towards one of the two
extremes. In such instances, government
intervention was advocated to protect con
sumers from unreasonably high prices or to
protect airlines from artificially low fares due
to government subsidies (Doganis 2001).
With the above-mentioned objective and
others favoring true liberalization, the
Clinton administration, in April 1995, issued
the first formal statement of international
air transportation policy in 17 years.
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Following this statement, the United States
prepared for a phased removal of restrictions
and liberalization of the air service market.
As a result, on tariffs, double disapproval or
the country of origin rule was replaced by the
decision that government should not inter
fere in tariff setting, except in extreme in
stances to prevent discriminatory practices.
However, published international fares still
continue to be established through the rate
setting machinery of IATA.
Air freight services are now sold and
marketed in a variety of ways by line haul
operators, integrators, and freight
forwarders (Williams 1994). The line haul
operators sell only a small proportion of their
cargo space directly to customers. The
greater proportion of their cargo space is sold
through freight forwarders and agents who
negotiate a fixed amount of space with the
airlines. The freight forwarders and agents
then sell the freight space to customers. The
line haul carriers publish their cargo rates at
IATA tariff conferences. On the other hand,
integrated operators offer a variety of pro
ducts and services, depending upon the
weight of the consignment and delivery
speed required by shippers.
Air cargo rates, irrespective of the operator
(line-haul, integrated operators, or freight
forwarders) providing the service, are
determined on the basis of a number of char
acteristics and circumstances, including the
nature of the commodity, cargo volume,
density, weight, routing season, regularity of
shipments, nature of transport (imports or
exports), priority and speed of delivery
(Williams 1994; Frankel 1982). Discounts on
cargo rates are widely applied and are based
on the volume of cargo transported and the
regularity of the customer. However, air
cargo rates tend to vary a great deal based
upon the nature of the commodity and its
64
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destination (Williams 1994). This rate
variation can be attributed to three main
factors that differentiate the airline industry
from other industries. These factors include
total dependence of an airline’s productivity
on its fleet, the large percentage of operating
costs not in control of the airline, and the
inability of an airline’s output (cargo space)
to be inventoried (Williams 1994).

International Ocean Transport
Regulation and Cargo Pricing
U.S. international ocean shipping is carried
out in U.S. owned flag vessels, U.S. owned
foreign flag vessels, and in foreign owned,
foreign flag vessels. U.S. flag shipping is
usually conducted in ships built and owned
by U.S. citizens and is comprised of tramp,
liner, proprietary, and independent shipping
(Federal Maritime Commission 2000).
Tramp shipping involves transporting mostly
one general, dry, or liquid bulk commodity
per voyage. Liner shipping, on the other
hand, involves carrying a wide range of cargo
from a number of shippers per voyage.
Proprietary shipping is usually employed in
the transport of a particular commodity and
is operated on behalf of a single economic in
terest (Federal Maritime Commission 2000).
Independent shipping generally consists of
dry or liquid bulk carriers chartered by
independent owners for a specific voyage or
time period on behalf of a particular firm
(Thomchick 2000; Federal Maritime Com
mission 2000).
The ocean shipping industry has undergone
many changes from the early 1900’s until
today. In the early 1910’s in the United
States, the ocean shipping industry was
largely self-regulated through organizations
of carriers in each trade route called
conferences that dominated liner trading

(Thomchick 2000; Federal Maritime Com
mission 2000). These conferences set rates
and influenced indirectly the number of
sailings in a particular route.
Congress passed the Shipping Act of 1916 to
define the provisions for the operation of
ocean shipping conferences (Thomchick 2000).
This act extended immunity to those agree
ments that were filed with and approved by
an independent regulatory agency that
eventually became the Federal Maritime
Commission (FMC) by executive order in 1961.
However, the practices of carriers that were
considered to be anti-competitive were curbed.
In the first half of the 1900’s, carriers forced
shippers to be loyal for a certain period of
time in order to get a reduced rate on ship
ments called deferred rebates. The Shipping
Act outlawed deferred rebates to shippers
(Federal Maritime Commission 2000). Carriers
were also prohibited from making unfair
contracts with shippers based on the volume
of cargo offered. Every carrier and conference
of carriers in international commerce were
required to file a schedule of rates and
charges with the FMC, which ruled that the
rates actually charged must be in compliance
with the schedule filed (Brooks 2000). Dual
rate contracts, contracts in which a shipper
gets a lower rate if he/she promises all or a
fixed percentage of cargo to a carrier or
conference of carriers, were permitted (Thom
chick 2000; Federal Maritime Commission
2000). However, they were subject to the
approval of the FMC.
In 1978, Congress passed the Ocean
Shipping Act as an amendment to the
Shipping Act of 1916 (Federal Maritime
Commission 2000). This act prohibited
carriers from maintaining rates and tariffs

below the level filed with the FMC. The
Shipping Act of 1916, though amended
numerous times, continued to be the major
U.S. maritime legislation governing ocean
shipping conference operations until 1984.
The Shipping Act of 1984 retained anti-trust
immunity for ocean conferences, but still
required carriers to file rates and charges
with the FMC (Thomchick 2000). Carriers
were finally allowed to enter into inde
pendent agreements with shippers outside
conferences, but were still required to obtain
approval from the conferences for such an
agreement. This act prohibited the adoption
of dual rates.
The next noteworthy legislation in the area
was the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1995
that attempted to eliminate tariff and
contract filing with the FMC, as well as
government tariff enforcement and regula
tion (Thomchick 2000; Lewis 2000). This act
was replaced by the Ocean Shipping Reform
Act (OSRA) of 1998.
In May 1999, OSRA took effect (Thomchick
2000; Lewis 2000), representing a logical
continuation of the trend toward deregu
lation established by the Shipping Act of
1984 (Kendall 1986). OSRA introduced a new
era of one-to-one confidential service con
tracts with creative provisions aimed to
weaken the dominance of conferences.
Contracts must still be filed with the FMC,
but the terms of the contract are not revealed
to the public as before (Brooks 2000).
Shippers are no longer able to use publicly
filed terms of a competitor for negotiating a
better deal with carriers. OSRA does not
require carriers to file tariffs with the FMC,
but requires carriers to publish tariff rates.
The discussion of the above laws and
regulations pertain to the liner sector of the
ocean shipping industry.
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Ocean cargo rates are now determined on the
basis of a number of factors, including the
cost of owning and operating the vessel, cost
of providing the service, value of the service
to the owner of goods, an appropriate profit
margin, ability of the cargo to sustain its
transport expenditure, degree of competition,
and prevailing economic conditions (Thornchick 2000; Button and Stough 2000).
Although these factors provide a general
basis for arriving at a rate for transporting
cargo, different approaches to pricing are
evident in the tramp and liner shipping
sectors.
Tramp shipping transports a single commod
ity like coal, grain, ore, or phosphate rock per
voyage. Since tramp shipping deals mostly
with one shipper and one commodity per
voyage, all the costs of operating the ship,
cargo handling, port fees and harbor dues are
added to the capital charges of vessel owner
ship, overheads and administration expenses
(Thomchick 2000; Button and Stough 2000).
The total of these costs is calculated in pro
portion to the number of tons to be hauled.
Thus, cargo rates in tramp shipping are
mainly dictated by demand/supply conditions
existing in the market (Thomchick 2000;
Button and Stough 2000).
The liner sector, on the other hand, carries a
wide range of cargo from a number of
shippers per voyage. Therefore, rate struc
tures in the liner sector are more complex
than in the tramp sector. Liner rates are
usually based on the stowage factor and the
amount of vessel space occupied by the cargo.
If a cargo has a stowage factor less than 40,
then it does not utilize the space in the vessel
efficiently (Thomchick 2000). The liner
operator has the right to charge the shipper
either on the basis of weight or measure,
whichever yields the highest revenue. Also,
since liner shipping involves carrying a wide
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variety of cargo, rates can be quoted per
linear foot, per head, per thousand feet, per
barrel, and so on (Thomchick 2000; Button
and Stough 2000).
Surcharges are often applied to liner cargo
rates on certain occasions to help cover short
term economic conditions, including the
adverse effects of fuel price increases, insur
ance rate increases, currency fluctuations,
and trade imbalances (Button and Stough
2000). These surcharges are applied regard
less of the method (tariffs or service contracts)
employed for determining the price for
transporting the cargo. When tariff pricing is
adopted, shippers do not have the advantage
of negoti ating a favorable price with the
carriers, since published tariff rates must not
be changed. If service cont racts are employed,
shippers reserve the right to negotiate a
favorable rate with the carrier (Thomchick
2000).

METHODOLOGY
Samples
The design of the sampling methodology
involved surveying firms that ship goods
internationally via either air or ocean trans
port. The sampling technique employed for
conducting this research was convenience
sampling. The sample was chosen from a
group of firms with which the faculty in the
Smeal College of Business Administration
has business relationships. A sample of 12
firms that are international shippers of goods
was chosen.

Survey Instrument
The survey instrument was a structured
questionnaire consisting of 17 questions. Most
of the survey questions were left open-ended in
an attempt to avoid restricting information

from the respondents. The main focus of each
survey was to identify the price negotiation
strategies adopted by the firm while negoti
ating with its air or ocean carriers.

Survey Technique
The survey technique involved initially
contacting all the firms that comprised the
sample via phone to briefly describe the
purpose of the survey. This was then
followed by sending out questionnaires via email. From the twelve firms in the sample,
only seven firms responded to the email
survey. No follow-up contacts were made.
Though only seven firms responded to the
survey, the authors believe the quality of the
data and the integrity of the questionnaire
are high. By using this approach, it was
possible to identify the most appropriate
individuals in the firms who could provide
the requested information.

Demographics of the Sample
All the respondents were manufacturing
firms that are international shippers of goods
using either air, ocean, or both for trans
porting goods. All the firms in the sample
spend an average of at least $7 million on
transportation per year. The goods trans
ported by the respondents included medical,
consumer, electronic, paper, glass, chemical,
and computer products.

STUDY RESULTS
Strategies Adopted by Shippers in
International Air Transport
Negotiations
The process of international air cargo
distribution has undergone noteworthy
changes in the past couple of decades due to
the deregulation of the air industry and the

ubiquitous emphasis placed on lean produc
tion methods and supply chain management
techniques. Transporting cargo by air has
gained importance in this changing environ
ment since air offers a faster and more
reliable mode of transport than that offered
by ocean.
The study data indicate that air was used for
transporting finished goods that had high
intrinsic value per ton/kilo/pound. Air was
also used for transporting goods that were
originally shipped by ocean, when shipments
were to he expedited. Many firms indicated
that, for cargo that could move either by air
or ocean, the mode was selected based on the
value of the product, type of product, service
level, critical nature of the freight, transit
time, time available to reach the market
place, and cost of the material in the supply
chain. In certain firms, the mode of transport
was determined by affiliates in foreign
countries. The decision process in those firms
was influenced by product availability,
weight/volume of the product determining
the freight cost, transit time, and expected
time of arrival of the product at the
destination.
The carrier for transporting the product was
selected from a variety of sources across
firms. These sources include trade journals,
solicitations, networking through the
international trade industry, on-line auction
process, recommendations from other firms,
and carriers already in use. The air cargo
carriers identified through various sources
were then short listed based on their ability
to satisfy certain service requirements. The
strategies adopted for selecting the carriers
varied from one firm to another with the
process being influenced by numerous factors.
Some firms identified their service require
ments and weighed these requirements
against the cargo carrying capacity of the
Fall 2003
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carriers. All the carriers with adequate cargo
carrying capacity to meet the shipping
requirements of the firm were short listed.
These short listed carriers were then weighed
against various secondary factors and the
carrier that best met all of the service
requirements of the shipper was finally
selected.
Other firms identified and short listed those
carriers that were willing to enter into long
term partnerships or global alliances. These
carriers were then weighed against several
other secondary factors and the carrier with
the ability to provide the best service in
terms of all the factors required by the shipper
was selected. A limited number of respondents
placed primary emphasis on the experience of
the carrier in the industry and the overall
service provided.
The secondary factors that influenced the
carrier selection process include frequency of
service, price, transit time, infrastructure,
financial stability, size, delivery capabilities,
ability to consolidate volumes over various
trade lanes, and quality of the overall service
provided. Service provided by the carrier was
considered the most important factor in the
carrier selection process by most respon
dents. Many firms are now focusing more on
customer service and inventory management
techniques, and this may be the cause for the
additional emphasis placed on service by the
shipping firms. Price of the service provided
was considered the second most important
factor by some firms while transit time was
regarded as the next important factor after
service by most firms.
In addition to the above-mentioned factors,
technology played an important role in the
carrier selection process in a number of firms.
The carriers are now selected based upon
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their ability to provide on-line bookings, on
line cargo tracking, and the ability to create
shipper issued commercial invoices via
Electronic Data Interchange.
Thus, each shipping firm has a primary
criterion for short listing the air cargo
carriers that operated in the market. All the
carriers that satisfied the primary criterion
were then evaluated on their ability to
satisfy other requirements of the firm. The
carrier that satisfied both the primary and
secondary criteria to the maximum possible
extent was selected. The carrier selection
process in each firm was very detailed and
based upon the performance of carriers on a
variety of aspects.
Following the carrier selection process, the
shippers negotiated with the selected carrier
on a number of issues. These negotiations
were conducted on a centralized basis in all
the firms that responded to the survey.
Although negotiations were conducted on a
centralized basis, many firms regionalized
the negotiations based on the diverse
requirements of subsidiaries in each region.
The negotiations were handled by different
departments in each firm. In certain firms,
the negotiations were handled by a common
department called either, “World Wide Distri
bution Procurement,” “Corporate Logistics,” or
“International Transportation Department.”
Other firms had separate departments
handling negotiations for each of the modes.
Some of the firms that responded had different
departments that conducted negotiations for
inbound and outbound shipments. The depart
ments that handled inbound negotiations in
some firms are either called “Global Sourcing”
or “Inbound Team,” and the departments that
handled outbound negotiations are either
called “Logistics” or “Customer Focus Group.”

Although price was considered to be the only
factor in the negotiations between shippers
and carriers, negotiations were conducted on
several other factors as well. While, for
certain shippers, service was the most impor
tant negotiating factor, for others, a variety
of factors were on equal par when negotia
tions were conducted. However, all the firms
negotiated on a variety of issues with their
carriers, including overall service provided,
frequency of service, price, transit times,
liability, reporting capabilities, accessorial
fees and surcharges, trade lanes, and length
of contract. In some firms, the length of the
contract with the carrier was determined
based upon a number of factors, such as the
number of trade lanes served, terms of re
negotiation, and value added services
provided. A limited number of respondents
also placed emphasis on guaranteed cargo
space, type of equipment used, equipment
availability, cargo tracking capabilities, and
performance metrics during the negotiating
process. The negotiations were also
conducted on the ability of the carrier to

establish electronic links with freight for
warders to obtain cargo status, to ensure a
proactive approach in identifying cargo
delays, to provide automated pre-alert in
formation to the customer, to identify
opportunities to allow for pre-clearance of
cargo, and to provide multiple service options
for each lane.
The shipping firms adopted different
strategies to arrive at an affordable price
while negotiating with the carriers, as
depicted in Figure 1. Every firm that
responded to the survey employed more than
one negotiation strategy. These price
negotiation strategies included entering into
long term agreements, concentrating on re
lationship building measures, leveraging
volume to reduce price, floating bids to get a
competitive price from the existing base of
carriers, consolidation of various lanes,
density factors, size of the carrier, financial
stability, and alliances the carriers had with
other lines.

FIGURE 1
PRICE NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES ADOPTED BY SHIPPERS
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Some shipping firms also opted to employ
overseas resources of the carriers to satisfy
the needs and requirements of their cus
tomers. This, in turn, provided the carrier
with potential opportunities in foreign
countries, which resulted in a reduction in the
service price for the shipper. During the
negotiation process, certain firms identified
opportunities to simplify the documentation
process in an attempt to reduce handling fees.
Thus, several potential opportunities to reduce
the price without hurting overall service are
explored during the negotiation process.
Shippers and carriers also use the negotiating
table to explore opportunities that would
benefit both the parties from the relationship.

Strategies Adopted by Shippers in
International Ocean Transport
Negotiations
The ocean shipping industry has undergone
many changes as well due to maritime dereg
ulation culminating in OSRA, which took
effect in May 1999. OSRA has replaced
conferences that once dominated the liner
shipping industry with confidential contracts
between shippers and carriers. This change
has enabled carriers to collaborate on a
variety of issues while maintaining their free
dom and flexibility to conduct business with
shippers on a one-to-one basis.
A major portion of the physical distribution of
international freight is still carried by ocean
with air being used only for the transport of
high value, low-bulk items and when ship
ments need to be expedited. Although all of
the respondents in the study used both air
and ocean for transporting goods globally,
around 75 to 95 percent of the overall volume
of cargo they transported was carried by the
ocean mode.
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There was no difference whatsoever in the
strategies adopted by the respondents in the
carrier selection process between the two
different modes. As in the air mode of
transport, the respondents required the ocean
carrier also to possess technological capabili
ties to provide on-line ocean bills of lading and
on-line cargo tracking, in addition to other
general abilities required. Technology is fast
emerging as a vital factor in the carrier
selection process, regardless of the mode
employed for transporting the products.
Shippers conducted negotiations with the
selected carrier on a variety of aspects,
including price, overall service, frequency of
service, length of contract, and trade lanes.
The strategies adopted by shipping firms
while negotiating price with the carriers was
similar to those adopted while negotiating
price with air cargo carriers. Thus, all the
firms that responded to the survey adopted
the same approach while selecting their
carriers, regardless of the mode they operated
in, and employed similar strategies while
negotiating with them on various aspects.
These negotiations were conducted on a
centralized basis, and the department that
handled these negotiations varied from one
firm to another. OSRA had completely altered
the manner in which shipping firms negoti
ated with their carriers. Shippers are now
placing additional emphasis on overall service
provided, rather than on price alone, as was
done in the period prior to OSRA.
All the respondents that ship goods by ocean
after the inception of OSRA move them under
service contracts. Many shipping firms share
the opinion that the contracts to/from the U.S.
after OSRA are more similar to contracts
outside the U.S. There is also mention about

the increase in the number of contracts with
multiple trade lanes after the passage of
OSRA.
The negotiation process after OSRA became
effective is purely confidential, thereby making
the process highly competitive. Shippers are
now entering into long term agreements with
carriers to obtain leverage on the price based
on the volume of cargo transported. Some of
the respondents have reduced their carrier
base by approximately 50 percent after the
passage of OSRA, and are focusing their
efforts in building relationships with a limited
base of carriers. Conferences and conference
contracts have become less meaningful in the
post-OSRA environment, paving the way for
individual agreements with strong emphasis
on relationship building.

MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS
There is no doubt that both the air and ocean
industry have witnessed significant changes
after the ‘open skies’ bilateral and OSRA,
respectively, became effective. These changes
have in turn brought about changes in the
way shippers and carriers in each of the
modes conduct business with each other. This
research has attempted to identify the influ
ence of these and prior regulatory changes in
the operations of both the industries, espe
cially in pricing, and the strategies adopted by
shippers and carriers in the wake of these
recent developments.
The “open skies” bilateral completely elimin
ated tariff controls in the air industry and
attempted to increase the variety of price and
service options for shippers. Government inter
vention in pricing was virtually eliminated,
paving the way for free pricing. On the other
hand, in the ocean shipping industry, OSRA
brought about a new approach of one-to-one

confidential contracts between shippers and
carriers, thereby attempting to weaken the
dominance of conferences in rate fixing. These
deregulation reforms have ensured a signifi
cant transformation in the operations of both
the industries which are outlined below.
After the “open skies” bilateral came into
effect in the air industry, firms are now
shipping most of their air cargo under
contracts. In a similar fashion, the once
traditional liner shipping industry has now
moved closer to embracing confidential agree
ments with shippers since the inception of
OSRA. Many of the conferences have dis
solved in the wake of OSRA. Now, more than
80 percent (Brooks 2000)of ocean cargo moves
under service contracts with tariffs being
employed only on a very limited basis for
small or one time shipments.
Shippers in both modes now have the freedom
to select carriers based upon their ability to
provide the required service. New develop
ments in technology have forced many
shippers to conduct their operations in an ebusiness environment in an attempt to adapt
to the changes in the marketplace. This has
resulted in the evolution of an interesting
trend in the carrier selection process that
requires carriers to use electronic purchasing
tools such as Request-For-Information (RFI)
and Request-For-Pricing (RFP), to make them
eligible for selection. In addition, shippers are
now selecting carriers based upon their ability
to provide on-line bookings, on-line tracking of
shipments, and on-line ocean bills of lading.
Although each business has different needs,
priorities, and buying strategies, shippers
that employ these cutting edge technological
tools select carriers that have the ability to
conduct business electronically.
At present, negotiations are conducted on a
variety of issues including service, price, and
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trade lanes. In certain firms, negotiations are
conducted on a centralized basis while in
others they are conducted on a decentralized
basis. Each firm employs a different strategy
for getting an affordable price from carriers.
Many large multinational corporations lever
age their collective tonnage to receive the
lowest possible freight rates and the best
service in terms of transit times and cargo
space. An emerging trend now is that of
measuring the performance of carriers on
certain Key Performance Indicators (KPI’s),
such as cargo tracking capabilities, transit
time, and frequency of service that were
agreed during the negotiation process. These
KPI’s are used to evaluate the performance of
a carrier and to either award or terminate
business.

between shipper and carrier. In the future, it
is expected that the remaining conferences
will also disappear due to the fact that they
cannot satisfy the demands of multinational
shippers for global service contracts encom
passing multiple trade lanes. In addition,
more than 80 percent (Brooks 2000) of ocean
cargo moves under service contracts and
tariffs are adopted only on a very limited
basis. This has also contributed to the decline
of conferences. In future, OSRA may eventu
ally eliminate tariffs, giving prominence only
to confidential one-to-one contracts between
shippers and carriers. In these circumstances,
it would be highly intriguing to find out the
changes in strategies adopted by shippers and
carriers in ocean transport while negotiating
with each other.

The negotiation strategies adopted by firms
continue to evolve based upon the service
requirements of the shipper and the ability of
the carrier to meet those needs. In these
circumstances, a further liberalization in both
the air and ocean industry would mean more
changes in the operation of both the industries.

FUTURE RESEARCH

The airline industry at present is moving
toward “clear skies” bilaterals, aimed at re
moving the existing constraints on airline
ownership by foreign nationals, and certain
other provisions that pertain mostly to air
passenger transport. Within the first decade
of this millennium, the ownership and
investment rules are most likely going to be
liberalized (Thomchick 2000). It would be
valuable to identify the changes that these
provisions of “clear skies” bilaterals will have
on the way operations and negotiations are
conducted in the air cargo industry.
The ocean shipping industry has witnessed
big changes since OSRA became effective.
Some conferences have disbanded, paving
the way for individual discussion agreements
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A small sample was selected based on
convenience, keeping the time frame short
for the completion of the study. A more
detailed study with a larger sample, strati
fied on the basis of the amount wspent for
international transportation of goods per
year, might have yielded more information.
This might also have provided information on
any differences, if any, in the carrier selec
tion process and price negotiation strategies
employed by small, medium, and large inter
national shipping firms.
The e-mail survey method was chosen for its
efficiency and convenience in contacting
respondents within a short time frame.
However, this method might have limited
the volume and detail of information
provided by the respondents. Personal inter
views may have resulted in more detailed
replies.
Future research on this topic could use a
stratified sample based upon the amount

spent for international shipping of goods per
year and employ personal interviews. This

would provide more information that may
not have been revealed by this study.
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